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rhan a bir for luck would give an annual incremental cosr of, say, 
$48,000: hardly enough ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA. 
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical. 
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are more expensive is 
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor 
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military 
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers 
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an 
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communications or infrastruc-
ture support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian 
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs 
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of 
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char 
can be eliminated from the debate altogether. 
Philosophy 
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open 
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh 
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr 
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in 
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" differ-
ences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis 
wider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our 
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle. 
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr sug-
gests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell iger-
enrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rson-
nel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers 
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary. 
However, attacks on humanitarian workers (such as chose char have 
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion 
over rhe mili rary or civilian status of rhe victims, or because of a per-
ceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried our 
because rhe arrackers wish ro drive away humanitarian workers. 
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr 
isn ' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested 
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful 
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr 
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an 
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf' we should 
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second 
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy enough 
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn 
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan 
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs) 
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business! 
Conclusion 
Although relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average 
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is on par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine 
action community and che financial and p hilosophical argumenrs 
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a 
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co 
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must 
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs from 
the use of military TAs. 
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BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS 
For many years, a large debate over the use of military 
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals 
are against military demining arguing the military performs dif-
ferent techniques and holds different priorities from humanitari-
an demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as 
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military 
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still 
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII) 
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields 
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts 
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It 
is important to understand this process does not take place dur-
ing a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework 
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining. 
Hi1tory 
The explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) service was created immediately after 
WWl. This service was acrive throughout 
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each 
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many 
landmines were disposed of, givi ng th e 
impression ic would only take a few months ro 
complere che project. Unfortunately, it 
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from 
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe 
O rdnance Disposal Service was created on 
October 3, I 923 . 
After WWII , numerous Belgian 
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the 
obstacles and m ines la id in both world wars. 
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgium. 
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was 
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were 
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and 
preserve any d evices of military importance. 
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns 
char suffe red from bombing during the wars 
and in places where old minefields, ammuni-
tion dumps or explosive charges were discov-
ered. The EOD service activities conrinually 
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in 
constant conracr with several resistance groups 
and wirh allies. Through this constant interac-
tion, EOD was able to inform London of p os-
sible manufacturing errors in fusing sysccms 
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs. 
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered 
explosives of defused devices and passed on 
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance 
groups for sabotage purposes. 
On Ocrober 16, 1944, the 
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal 
Service was creared as an official addicion ro 
rhe EOD service and Belgian Armed Forces. 
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis 
by Captain Vincent Muylkens, Belgian 
Defense Staff Operations & Training EOD 
in EOD 
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal 
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro 
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under 
one single command. 
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD 
service srrucrure changed constantly as 
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and 
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly 
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe 
authorities believed an EOD service was no 
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service 
was again imminenr. However, on July 4, 
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro 
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis 
decision was never broughr ro execution , and 
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consist-
ed of 350 men. T he Explosive Ordnance and 
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary 
unir sraws unril May I, 1948, when ic became 
an organization of the basic Armed Forces. 
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw 
many changes, essenrially as a resulc of che 
reorgani7.-ation of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the 
end of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased 
ro 11 5 personnel. 
In O ctober 1971 , the army dete r-
mined rhe EOD service would no longer be an 
independent unit. However, the early 1970s 
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which 
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of 
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car 
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of left-
over munirions from the two world wars 
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year, 
che EOD service received 3,000-4,000 
requests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less 
rhan three years after its dissolution rhe EOD 
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The I mer-service Territorial 
Command (lTC) was founded in 1995 due ro 
a general reorganisation of the armed forces. 
lTC was established to bring together all 
bomb disposal units in charge of territorial 
bomb disposal operations under one com-
mand. This was the last major change for the 
EOD unit. 
CurrCIInt ActivHiC118 
Today rhe Belgian bomb disposal 
battalion comprises 23 officers, 151 non-com-
missioned officers (NCOs), and 13 1 corporals 
and civil ians, rhus a total of 305 personnel of 
which 172 are bomb disposal experts ( 16 offi-
cers, I 00 NCOs and 56 corporals) . The bat-
talion is composed of three companies decen-
tral ised to cover the all-national territory. 
T he first task of the unit is the 
clearance of UXO and AXO left in Belgium 
from the two world wars. Despite rhe propos-
al to d issolve the unit in 1971, 
.u r' ~ 1 
I .,lit t't un ~ 1 \ .u r;n gi ug 1 I 1 '' 
1:1 ,, HI~' w 1 nr.h hnmb~ up w '\1 I kgn 
rnon.: 
Consequently, the battalion han-
dles a11 average of 250 tons of ammunition 
every year. Some 20 tons of "problem ammu-
ni tion" (suspected chemical ammuni tion) are 
recovered each year, especially in the areas of 
fighting during WWI. 
The Battalion's second mission is 
rhe dismantling of roxie and chemical ammu-
nition dari ng from WWI. The dismantling 
facil ity is located at the sire of conflict during 
WWI. During 1998 and 1999, tests were car-
ried out on real ammunition ro control the 
feasibility of rhe installation. The installation 
has been opera tional since October 1999. 
The third major task calls for the 
support of juridical autho ri ties in rhe field of 
terrorism and organised crime. This responsi-
bility averages around 150 interventions a year 
fo r the EOD Battalion . Suspect devices rang-
ing from letter bombs to car bombs arc inves-
tigated and rendered safe. The unit is also in 
charge of post-explosion investigations. The 
EOD Battalion is always ready ro intervene in 
case of a military air crash to recover ammuni-
tion and pyrotechn ic elements. It can also rely 
on diver-bomb disposal expens for diving mis-
sions in the hinterland and the territorial 
water surfaces. 
T he un it instructs its own bomb 
disposal experts and organises insrructional 
courses fo r police forces, juridical authorities 
and securi ty agents. The basic course to 
become an EOD operator cakes one year. 
After five years of experience, the non-com-
missioned EOD officer operator follows an 
advanced four-monrh course. Then the NCO 
can act as an EOD ream leader. In 2003, the 
Ministry of Defence requested char the bomb 
disposal school develop an EOD ream leader 
course for foreigners to parricipare in. T his 
four-month course is available to experienced 
EOD operators. 
Belgian military experts continually 
advise researchers involved in programs to 
support humani tarian demining. Regularly, 
rhe EOD operators support Belgian universi-
ties, the Royal Military Academy and many 
civilia n universities in their studies with the 
humanitarian demining domain. The EOD 
experts constandy rest new equipment and 
provide help to the students, based on their 
field experience. 
The last support provided by the 
Belgian military experrs encompasses the tech-
nical assistance to treaty and protocol develop-
ment. Belgian Defence sends mil itary experrs 
and both EOD and non-EOD operarors to 
inrernarional workshops and symposiums. 
During these development processes, the mil-
itary experts can provide counsel to develop-
ing treaties and protocol based on thei r field 
experiences. 
Beginning in 1990, Belgium began 
requesting UN support fo r its humanitarian 
activities and inform ing the world of irs 70 
years of lessons learned. 
Thus, the EOD Barralion began 
participating in operations abroad. One mis-
sion called for the protection of thei r own 
Belgian troops du ring deployments abroad. 
Others were conducted within the framework 
of humani tarian demining. Numerous units 
senr EOD experts to Rwanda (1986, 1993-
1994), Iraq ( 199 1 ), Former Yugoslavia 
( 1992- today), Somalia (1992-1993), 
Cambodia (1994-today), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (1997, 2004), Lao 
People's Demo-cratic Republic (PDR) 
( 1998-coday), Albania ( 1999) and Benin 
(200 1). 
The Battalion currendy has the following 13 
EOD operators abroad: 
• Three military EOD operators 
are stationed in Kosovo to protect Belgian 
troops, yet the Belgian EOD operators deal 
daily with UXO in civiJian areas. 
• Four military operators EOD 
experts are stationed in Cambodia as tech-
nical advisers for the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC). Between 1994 and 
1996, the Belgian experts were involved in 
the minefields. Their main task was to 
inform and advise, in the field, the CMAC 
deminers. Between 1996 and 2000, the 
advisers assisted in the creation of an EOD 
branch in CMAC with the cooperation of 
Dutch colleagues. Since 2000, the Belgian 
advisers have been alone in the support of 
a n EOD branch. The statistics of Cambodia 
show that 65 percent of the accidents are 
due to UXO and 35 percent are due to AP 
mines. The intention of CMAC is to build 
an EOD branch able to work throughout 
the country. 
• Two military EOD experts are 
deployed in the southern province of Lao, 
Champassak, in support of the activities of 
the Lao National UXO Project (UXO 
lAO). The BeJgian advisers support all the 
domains, not only the technical and opera-
tional, but also human resources, material 
resources, finance, etc. Since 1998, Belgium 
has provided technical advisers to assist the 
operations in the province. During the 15 
years of war, bombs were dropped on Lao 
PDR. Today it is a country covered with 
tons of UXO. The experience gained in 
Belgium since 1918 gives Belgium a good 
opportunity to help Lao PDR to build a 
long-term UXO disposal capacity to reduce 
the risk due to unexploded bomb live units 
(BLUs), bombs and other UXO. 
• Four EOD operators have been 
deployed in Bosnia since November 2003 
to reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR ) 
mission. The mission of this team is to 
assist Bosnia in the storage, transportation 
and demolition of large stocks of ammuni-
tion. 
Following the past experiences of 
Belgium's use of military experrs in human i-
tarian demining has an advantage, even if the 
humanitarian demin ing is normally nor a mil-
itary mission. When a country uses mil itary 
experts to build a national EOD capacity to 
clear the country, the costs are substantially 
lower. The majority of armies with an EOD 
capacity developed them to support military 
operations. During peaceful rimes, this capac-
ity is available and the operators can be used to 
clear the UXO on the national territory. The 
country does not need to pay twice to develop 
an EOD capacity for military operarions and 
an EOD capacity for national territory. lr is 
also evident that the experience gained on rhc 
nationa l territory can also be used to support 
programs abroad. 
Military expcrrs usually have a mi l-
irary channel rhar gives them access to techn i-
cal information. Thus, when the military 
experts are involved in support of the human-
itarian demining, it is easier ro ger access ro 
rhe needed rechn ical informacion . Directly 
after a conflict, milita•y units are regularly sent 
to control the peace process. T he miliraty 
EOD operators are able to starr wirh the 
urgcnr clearance operations and disposal of 
UXO. The co-operation with other actors will 
only provide benefits to rhe humanitarian sir-
uarion. A better coordination between mili-
tary experts and non-military expertS is also an 
advantage for research and development of 
mine action technologies with a reduction of 
the costs and an increase in the researchers 
involved. 
In conclusion, AP mines are a prob-
lem, bur they are unfortunately not d1e only 
problem after a conflict. Many statistics 
demonstrate today char UXO represent an 
important problem rhar may be larger than 
the AP mine problem. The experience of 
Belgium shows that many decades after the 
end of the hostilities, large quantities of UXO 
still remain on the ground. The demin ing 
acriviries of mincfields and rhe disposal of 
UXO arc major tasks rhar will rake a long 
rime. lr is in the interest of the inrernarional 
community to rake into accounr all available 
resources, included military operators. They 
perform the same job as the non-military 
operators with, in some cases, other priorities 
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